Is there a shortfall in public capital investment? An overview by Alicia H. Munnell




A nation can use its current output to provide for the future in
numerous ways: it can undertake private capital investment, add to the
stock of public capital, enhance income-producing assets abroad, invest
in human capital through education and health programs, conserve
natural resources and the environment, and invest in science and
technology. During the 1980s none of these approaches were pursued
vigorously and most of the country’s increase in output went for
consumption rather than the enhancement of future production; the
adverse effects of debt-financed consumption on private investment, net
foreign investment, and human capital have been well documented.
In the past few years, however, academic work, commission
reports, and natural disasters have highlighted the fact that the nation
has also been neglecting its stock of public capital. Stories abound of
deteriorating roads, bridges, and sewer systems, which have often led
to serious collapses or other disasters. Almost everyone has experienced
the frustration and delay of congestion on overburdened roads and
airports.
Political developments have also raised the importance of public
capital investment on the national agenda. At the federal level, disso-
lution of Cold War tensions has spurred debate on the reallocation of
spending from military to other uses, although this has been mitigated
somewhat by recent developments in the Persian Gulf. The impending
re-authorization of the federal highway bill also has sparked a great deal
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of interest. Fiscal problems at all levels of government have led policy-
makers and citizens to rethink spending priorities.
This conference aimed to determine the extent to which the United
States may be underinvesting in public infrastructure, explain the
potential economic consequences, and suggest mechanisms to help
alleviate any adverse trends. The conference focused on public invest-
ment in physical capital only to make the topic manageable, and should
not be interpreted to mean that investment in human capital is in any
way less important.
The conference consists of six sessions: The first three sessions
discuss various topics related to the importance of infrastructure, while
the last three tackle some practical policy issues in this area. The first
session addresses the broad question of why infrastructure is important
by discussing the impact of public capital on quality of life, the
environment, and output. The second introduces a new data set on
state-level public and private capital stocks to examine the impact of
public capital on output, investment, and employment growth at the
state level. The third session explores directly the question of whether
public infrastructure is undersupplied.
In the second, policy-oriented set of papers, the first explores the
extent to which the private sector can compensate for the lack of public
investment. The next two papers focus on incentives. One addresses the
issue of the efficiency of current infrastructure investment and pricing,
specifically as related to highways and airports. The other analyzes the
optimal financing of public infrastructure and investigates the incentives
imbedded in existing federal programs for public capital investment.
All conference participants agreed that public capital investment
plays an important role in enhancing both the quality of life and private
economic activity. All concurred that public capital, like private capital,
belongs in an economic production function, and that the decline in
public capital investment may have played some role in the productivity
downturn. A sharp disagreement arose over the estimated economic
importance of public infrastructure. The great majority of participants
rejected the estimates of the marginal productivity of public capital in
the range of 50 percent to 60 percent that emerge from the time series
analysis.
Despite the general acceptance of the economic and social impor-
tance of public capital investment, two quite different perspectives on
the need for more infrastructure investment emerge from the discus-
sion. On one side are those who see a strong link between public capital
investment and economic and social well-being; they view the current
stock of public capital as inadequate and believe that additional invesb
ment is required. On the other side are those who are primarily
concerned with the efficient use of existing infrastructure; they basicallyAN OVERVIEW 3
oppose increasing investment until the engineering, pricing, and fi-
nancing of infrastructure are closer to the optimum.
Why Is Infrastructure Important?
David Aschauer sets the stage for subsequent discussion and much
controversy by laying out the case for the importance of infrastructure to
the quality of life, the environment, and private economic activity.
In the first part of his paper, Aschauer presents an informal
discussion of the linkages between public capital investment and vari-
ous aspects of well-being, such as the human habitat, economic oppor~
tunity, and leisure time. The major point of this section is that many
observers question the ability of existing and projected infrastructure
facilities to adequately support quality-of-life requirements; their appre-
hensions are most pronounced in the areas of the environment and
transportation.
As evidence on the environmental front, Aschauer notes that,
despite large-scale expenditure following the passage of the Clean Water
Act in 1972, many streams and lakes in the United States remain
incapable of supporting their designated commercial or recreational
uses. The problem rests, in large part, with municipal wastewater
treatment facilities, which account for about one-third of the use
impairment of the waters. These treatment facilities also raise the
toxicity levels of lakes and rivers. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) says that many municipalities have yet to construct sewage
treatment facilities to meet permanent requirements.
A second area where inadequate infrastructure has an adverse
impact on both health and aesthetics is the treatment of solid waste.
Garbage is being generated at unprecedented rates, while the number of
facilities to handle the waste is shrinking. Between 1978 and 1986, the
number of operating landfills declined from 20,000 to 6,000. Forecasts
predict that by 1993 more than 2,000 of the remaining landfills will be
closed due to inadequate safety and environmental practices or capacity
constraints. These trends suggest increased health risks to residents and
damage to the environment.
In the area of transportation, inadequate public transportation
poses a serious barrier to employment for those without cars. Aschauer
notes that disabled citizens cite a lack of transportation as the primary
obstacle to obtaining jobs and being fully productive members of
society. Moreover, in many cities job opportunities in the suburbs
remain unfilled because of the lack of transportation from the urban
core.
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both impairs people’s leisure and raises business costs. The Federal
Highway Administration forecasts a 436 percent increase in urban
freeway congestion by the year 2005 if improvements to the interstate
system are not forthcoming. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration forecasts a significant increase in the number of airports suffering
serious delays during the next decade. In short, transportation is
another area requiring additional investment, or else inadequate infra-
structure likely will continue to detract from the quality of life.
In the second part of the paper, Aschauer shifts from quality-of-life
issues to the impact of infrastructure on economic activity. He cites
previous studies demonstrating the positive effect of public capital stock
on output, both within this country and across countries. He further
notes that public capital increases the rate of return to private capital,
thus stimulating private investment; at the same time it substitutes for
private investment, thus discouraging private initiatives.
Aschauer assembles these various forces into a simple model to
simulate the effect of higher public investment on the aggregate econ-
omy. Specifically, he assumes that public investment during the period
1970 to 1988 remained near the average for 1953 to 1969, thereby
eliminating most of the actual decline. The results suggest that the
increased public investment would have raised the rate of return to
private capital from 7.9 percent to 9.6 percent and the rate of produc-
tivity growth from 1.4 percent to 2.1 percent for the 1970-88 period. The
impact on private investment is more complicated; initially higher public
investment crowds out private investment, but eventually the higher
rate of return dominates and simulated private investment exceeds
actual levels. Aschauer emphasizes the tentative nature of these results
and goes on to address criticisms that have been raised about his
empirical work: that public investment is endogenous, that the esti-
mated coefficient on public capital is too large to be reasonable, and that
the model is too simple.
Aschauer then attempts to provide new evidence showing how
public sector capital affects private sector productivity. This time he
explores the relationship between private productivity and public capital
investment across states, by including government capital as an inter-
mediate input in a generalized Cobb-Douglas production function. To
work around the lack of state capital stocks, Aschauer rewrites the
production function so that the estimate of the relationship requires data
on only the capital-output ratio, rather than the level of capital stocks.
He then assumes, based on cross-country comparisons, that the capital-
output ratio is constant over time. As a result, individual state capital-
output ratios can be expressed as the ratio of investment to output times
the rate of growth of output plus the depreciation rate, which Aschauer
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Aschauer estimates the production function using data averaged
over the period from 1965 to 1983. His results show that state output per
worker is positively and significantly related to public investment in core
infrastructure, although the coefficient on the public investment variable
(representing the marginal product) is extraordinarily high. More pre-
cisely, while the marginal product of private capital in his equations
ranges between 9 and 12 percent, the marginal product of public capital
exceeds 200 percent. Again, Aschauer addresses likely criticisms of this
empirical exercise and attempts to demonstrate the robustness of his
results by varying the assumed depreciation rate and using instrumental
variables.
Aschauer concludes that given the importance of infrastructure,
both for quality of life and economic competitiveness, and the dissolu-
tion of Cold War tensions, the time seems ripe for a reorientation of
government spending priorities.
Henry Aaron, in commenting on Aschauer’s work, notes that
although Aschauer has made an important contribution to the produc-
tivity slowdown debate by including public capital as an explanatory
factor, several serious questions surround his empirical work. Aaron
cautions that if a result fits with our hopes and appears too good to be
true, it probably is, and should be subjected to careful scrutiny.
Most fundamentally, Aaron rejects the estimates of the productivity
of public capital in both Aschauer’s earlier work and the paper pre-
sented at this conference. In the case of the earlier results, which show
a productivity of public capital around 60 percent, Aaron attributes the
implausible estimates to the pitfalls of time series analysis. Aggregate
time series analysis based on variables expressed in levels is dominated
by trend, and produces marvelous fits that do not really explain much of
the relevant variance. Thus, unless the results are robust to estimation
using other functional forms, the hypothesis should not be considered
to have been proven. Another problem is that the production function
model assumes competitive factor markets. Public capital, however,
does not pass any market test in which productivity is balanced against
a cost measure.
In terms of the current paper, Aaron attributes the startling results
to an incredible list of assumptions required to estimate the model, and
argues that more tests should have been run to assess the sensitivity of
the results to other assumptions. He also raises another oft-cited
criticism--reverse causation, whereby rapid output growth and high
productivity lead to greater public investment, rather than public capital
investment causing greater output per hour. While Aschauer attempts
to treat this issue with instrumental variables, Aaron notes that he
should have examined it through direct modeling and testing.
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reasoning in Aschauer’s argument about quality-of-life effects. He sees
much of the advocacy for more infrastructure as a reflection of the
vested interests of those agencies and organizations that gain from
greater capital spending. Furthermore, while Aaron believes that gov-
ernment spending can improve the quality of life, this claim does
nothing to support the thesis that infrastructure contributes to national
output as conventionally measured.
Richard Musgrave also questions Aschauer’s high estimated coeffi-
cient on public capital and wonders about reverse causality, but focuses
his efforts on trying to identify the unique characteristics of infrastruc-
ture and other issues. He concludes that infrastructure as an interme-
diate good is distinguished by its joint and cross-industry use, and then
speculates whether these characteristics could lead to high productivity.
Musgrave also argues that much could be learned about the benefits
of public capital through cost-benefit analysis. While this approach has
its problems, it can, and should, be applied to estimate cost savings in
production where public capital is an intermediate good. Musgrave also
recommends that researchers attempt to quantify currently unrecorded
pieces of GNP, such as quality of life indicators, and apply cost-benefit
analysis to estimate the impact of infrastructure investment on these
unrecorded aspects of national output.
Musgrave concludes with the thought that although it was appro-
priate to limit the conference to the subject of physical infrastructure,
one must not forget that physical assets are only one part of the issue.
Public investment in health and education is no less important and
should be included in any more comprehensive analysis.
How Does Public Infrastructure Affect Regional
Economic Performance?
Alicia Munnell’s paper explores the impact of infrastructure invest-
ment on three measures of state-level economic performance. Since no
comprehensive measures of public or private capital stocks are available
at the state level, these data are constructed and used to estimate state
production functions, to explore the relationship between public and
private investment, and to analyze employment growth within a busi-
ness location model.
The first step is to construct estimates of the public and private
.capital stocks by state. For public capital stocks, the perpetual inventory
method is employed to generate an estimate of the net value of state and
local government capital investments, which is then used to apportion
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) national stock estimates among the
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among states based on measures of each state’s activity in various
sectors of the economy. The observations show significant variation and
appear to contain real information.
Munnell then introduces these stock estimates as inputs in a pooled
cross-section production function based on data for 1970 to 1986. The
results indicate that public capital has a significant, positive impact on
output at the state level. The regression coefficients also show rough
equivalence between the marginal products of private and public capital;
specifically, the coefficients imply a marginal productivity of 35 percent
for both private and public capital. They also suggest slightly increasing
returns to scale across the three inputs. When public capital was
disaggregated, water and sewer systems had the largest impact on
output, followed by highways, with other public capital exhibiting a
very small impact.
The next section examines the relationship between public and
private investment in which two opposing forces are at work. On one
hand, public capital enhances the productivity of private capital, raising
the rate of return and encouraging more private investment. On the
other hand, public capital serves as a substitute for private capital. An
attempt is made to combine these opposing influences in a stock-
adjustment model, where the desired stock of private capital is related to
the level of output, the stock of labor, and the stock of public capital, and
also to the marginal productivity of private capital. The results, while
not robust, indicate that, on balance, public capital investment stimu-
lates private investment. Munnell notes that these results should be
interpreted only as an additional bit of evidence supporting public
capital’s economic importance and as an invitation to future researchers.
Finally, a business location model that includes a measure of public
capital stock is used to analyze employment growth. This type of model
assumes that firms strive to.maximize profits and will choose a location
based on their profitability at alternative sites. Any characteristics of the
location that affect production costs or sales will influence this decision.
The specification used by Munnell analyzes the average annual percent
change in private employment in the state as a function of variables
reflecting the labor market, energy costs, cost of land, market size, tax
burden, and public capital stock. Munnell notes that the results are
generally in line with what one would expect, with public capital having
a positive influence on employment growth, all else equal.
Taken together, the results of these three exercises indicate that
public capital has a positive impact on private sector output, investment,
and employment. Some areas need significantly more research and
refinement, but these results are another piece in the emerging picture
of public capital’s economic importance. Munnell concludes that more
spending on public investment, which clearly would remedy serious8 Alicia H. Munnell
safety hazards and improve the quality of life, may also induce greater
productivity and growth.
In his comments, Charles Hulten, while finding the coefficient on
public capital in the production function quite plausible, and substan-
tially more so than the results of aggregate time series estimates, notes
several problems. First, since the nation’s infrastructure networks are
largely complete, the estimated coefficient on public capital may over-
state the benefits from additional public investment. Second, without
resource costs one cannot discern whether the allocation of public
capital is efficient. Third, only a state’s own public capital stock enters
into the production function, which ignores the benefits that a state may
derive from the public capital stocks in neighboring jurisdictions.
Fourth, the equations include no adjustment for congestion. Finally, the
production function is only one equation within a simultaneous system,
and thus the correlation between public capital and private output might
come from other parts of the economic system, which brings up the
perennial issue of the direction of causation.
Ann Friedlaender sketches out an alternative framework that could
be used in this type of research, a framework that would address the
problem of resource costs. She advocates estimating a cost rather than a
production function. This model would incorporate input price effects
into the analysis, as well as allowing analysis of the efficiency of capital
allocation. While admitting that the data requirements of this approach
are substantial, she offers reasonable guidelines for estimating certain
data, such as the cost of private and public capital by state. Friedlaender
also proposes that one could add demand effects into the analysis
through the use of a benefit function. She concludes that such an
approach is feasible and could yield interesting results to supplement
the existing evidence on the importance of infrastructure to regional
output, investment, and employment.
Is Public Infrastructure Undersupplied?
George Peterson addresses directly the question of whether public
infrastructure is undersupplied. He begins by tracing the historical
pattern of infrastructure spending over a longer period than previous
studies. While public capital spending has indeed declined from its peak
in the 1960s, this decline is only one downturn in a longer history of
cyclical behavior. Moreover, the fact that infrastructure investment has
declined does not in itself indicate that it is undersupplied. Thus, more
information is required to determine whether there is a shortfall in
public capital.
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argument that the marginal productivity of public capital is extremely
high compared to private capital. This suggests an undersupply even if
the infrastructure has no value in providing services directly to the
consumer. Peterson then looks to the taxpayer-voter for further evi-
dence that infrastructure may be undersupplied.
Peterson obtains a partial answer through voters’ revealed prefer-
ences as expressed in bond elections and other referenda. The answer is
partial because only 25 percent of infrastructure spending passes
through this process. Nevertheless, if public officials were trying to
satisfy the median voter, as theory suggests, they would submit
frequent .bond proposals for consideration in order to assess voter
demand. As a result, bond elections should be closely contested with
bond approval rates and margins close to 50 percent. Instead, he finds
that 80 percent of infrastructure bond proposals were approved between
1984 and 1989, and that the margin of approval exceeded 66 percent on
average. This experience suggests an undersupply. But why? What
forces could frustrate the demands of both business, which can gain as
much from public capital investment as from its own investment, and
the electorate, which appears disposed to approve higher levels of
public capital outlays?
Peterson suggests three possible explanations. The first emphasizes
spillover effects. As long as some of the benefits from public capital
investment spill over to users outside the local taxing district, and these
users do not contribute to the costs of the projects, local taxpayers, who
consider only their own benefit-cost trade-off, will choose to provide a
suboptimal level of infrastructure capital, This problem could be solved
through a user fee system, where all users, regardless of where they
live, pay a fee to cover the marginal costs they impose on the network.
In those instances when user fees are impractical, an alternative solution
is intergovernmental matching grants.
A more innovative explanation is Peterson’s notion that the under-
supply might be traced to the "fear of rejection" on the part of public
officials. Since the taxpayer revolts of the 1970s and early 1980s, the very
act of referendum voting--and the possibility it brings of public repu-
diation-appears to intimidate officials. Rather than designing proposals
to satisfy the median voter, they aim at garnering as large a majority as
possible in order to minimize the chance of rejection. As a result, public
capital spending proposals are simply not brought to the attention of
voters.
Peterson’s third explanation suggests that the political process
systematically underweights the benefits from infrastructure that accrue
to businesses. He contends that the principle of "one person, one vote"
provides no mechanism for aggregating the interests of both business
and taxpayers.10 Alicia H. Munnell
Peterson concludes that infrastructure undersupply is as much a
problem of politics as of economics. He argues that traditional decision-
making processes are badly designed to handle joint consumer and
producer demand for public goods. He also rejects the trend toward
creating authorities and other institutions that can invest in infrastruc-
ture without submitting to the referendum process. Rather, he advo-
cates the formation of business and consumer alliances that together
take the case for infrastructure spending directly to the public.
Alan Blinder, while agreeing that infrastructure is undersupplied,
and that the causes include public officials’ fear of rejection and
externalities, questions the argument that business needs are not well
represented in the political process. Each of us is both a producer and a
consumer, and there is no evidence that people vote only their con-
sumer interests. Furthermore, in an age when business has successfully
lobbied to further its interests on regulatory, antitrust, and trade
protection issues, why should one believe that it is completely mute on
the infrastructure front?
Because of the growth in both the economy and population that has
occurred during this century, Blinder considers it inappropriate to
compare only the absolute levels of capital spending across time. He
notes that Peterson’s median voter model implicitly assumes that the
number of bond referenda proposed derives from previous approval
rates. That may be a "good" model, .but it does not embody rational
expectations. Furthermore, while Blinder agrees that user fees are an
appropriate way to deal with externalities, he cautions that user fees
may not do the job if a free rider problem exists within a jurisdiction.
Joel Tarr focuses on the cyclical nature of infrastructure spending in
an attempt to place the current developments in a historical context. He
explains that both public and private capital spending have exhibited
irregular cycles of spending bursts followed by periods of retrenchment
and stability. Further, spending has shifted over time among levels of
government and between private and public providers.
State governments were especially active from the 1820s through
the 1840s, but curtailed their activities after depressions. Cities then
assumed the role of primary infrastructure provider during the 1860s
and early 1870s, after states suffered from over-investment, high taxes,
corruption, and subsequent borrowing limitations.
At this point, private provision again became important, especially
in water supply, as many municipal governments experienced defaults
on their obligations and were hampered by spending limitations im-
posed by state governments. By the 1890s, however, municipalities
regained their position as primary provider, which they held until
World War I; after the war the states resumed the dominant role with
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The federal government was not deeply involved in providing
capital investment until the 1930s. It dominated through World War II.
Since then, federal financing of capital spending has exhibited the
familiar cycles of boom and bust.
Tarr then discusses the common characteristics of previous infra-
structure spending bursts. Concerns over deterioration of facilities and
adequacy of services have generally not been sufficient to spur invest-
ment. Earlier periods of rapid investment were characterized by a
variety of demand- and supply-side conditions: major urbanization;
critical technological developments, such as the automobile, the air-
plane, or advances in bacterial science; and new funding mechanisms,
such as the gas tax.
Tarr concludes that current social, political, fiscal, and technological
forces are unlike any previous period of growth in infrastructure
investment, and thus suggests that those interested in expanding
investment should investigate a variety of flexible approaches to achieve
this goal.
What Are the Prospects for Privatizing Infrastructure?
Jose Gomez-Ibanez, John Meyer, and David Luberoff explore one
alternative by investigating the prospects for privatizing infrastructure
investment. Specifically, they analyze whether the private sector can do
a more effective job of investing in and pricing infrastructure services.
They focus on highways and wastewater treatment facilities as two areas
where private participation appears most promising.
They make clear at the beginning that they would expect privatiza-
tion to have little impact on the total quantity of infrastructure. In fact,
they contend that the nation would probably end up with more
infrastructure under public provision than under private. Their argu-
ment is that private infrastructure investment is likely to displace some
other capital project, since it is financed from a limited pool of private
savings. Public provision, in contrast, has some possibility of increasing
total investment to the extent that the project is funded by user charges
or taxes that are paid from a reduction in current consumption rather
than from saving.
Rather than altering the ~quantity of infrastructure, privatization
affects the distribution of burden between users, taxpayers, and wage
earners. The conventional argument in favor of privatization is that the
private sector is inherently more efficient and thus could build and
operate facilities at a lower cost than the public sector. This argument
has been augmented in recent years by the concern that the public sector
may be unable to finance facilities because of taxpayer resistance.12 Alicia H. Munnell
The commonly cited cost advantages of privatization are not en-
tirely clear, the authors argue. Some of the reduction in cost reflects
transfers among groups rather than real savings for society as a whole.
For example, landowners may be more likely to donate rights-of-way to
private road projects, but this is merely a transfer from landowners to
road builders and does not change the amount of land needed for the
project or the resource costs to society as a whole. On the other hand,
private firms do have some real cost advantages: they have a stronger
incentive and more flexibility to use resources productively, they can
often build facilities more quickly, and they may be better able to exploit
economies of scale, scope, and experience.
Proponents of privatization bemoan provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 that restrict the use of tax-exempt financing for private
projects; they claim that the higher financial costs for private providers
make it difficult for them to compete fairly with the public sector.
Gomezqbanez, Meyer, and Luberoff argue, however, that even without
tax exemption the costs of private and public providers do not differ
markedly, since private providers can deduct interest payments as a
business expense.
Cost, however, is often neither the only, nor the most important
factor in the decision whether a particular project should be provided
privately or publicly. Siting is often a major problem for highways as
well as solid waste disposal facilities. Private providers may have some
advantages in siting by allaying concerns of local residents and forming
alliances with them before the project falls under the public spotlight,
while public agencies are generally required to conduct site searches
openly from the start. The private sector may also be more skilled in
public relations~better able to market the benefits and minimize the
risks of a project. Private involvement, however, does not eliminate the
pressures or opportunities for government oversight or public involve-
ment in siting decisions, since private facilities still require zoning
permits and environmental approvals. Moreover, the public may be
concerned that private firms may not take their environmental and other
community responsibilities seriously. Public agencies may have an
advantage simply because they have more established institutions and
procedures for dealing with these issues. On balance, the authors do not
find that the private sector offers any major advantages in siting.
Other important issues are those of pricing and rate-regulation.
User charges seem to be appropriate financing mechanisms for both
solid waste disposal and highways. While the choice of provider need
not dictate the type of financing, the question arises whether a private
firm or a public agency is more likely to charge the appropriate or
socially desirable price. An argument in favor of private firms is that
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charges to reflect the costs imposed by different types of users. The most
important disadvantage of a private provider is that it may be tempted
to exploit any monopoly power it might enjoy. Some states have turned
to regulation to mitigate this problem; this strategy, however, may be
inefficient because it could stifle market signals to increase capacity. In
other words, the regulatory process, while necessary, could undermine
many of the advantages of private involvement in infrastructure provi-
sion.
The authors then try to make some overall assessments about the
winners and losers from privatization, with the caveat that the incidence
of gains and losses depends in large part on the individual project.
Organized labor and landowners are the most likely losers in private
provision, due to the private firm’s greater incentives to capture eco-
nomic rents. The clearest winners are federal and state taxpayers.
Investors might gain if they can hold onto economic rents or efficiency
gains rather than passing them on to facility users; the outcome will
depend on the competitiveness of the market for the particular service.
Thus, privatization is a more attractive policy for the public where the
potential efficiency gains are great and the private operator faces
effective competition.
The discussants find little with which to disagree. Sir Alan Waiters
adds that another argument for private provision is reducing the power
of unions, thereby not only lowering wages but also reforming what he
views as deleterious work practices. He also points out that the authors
focus only on new construction and do not consider privatization of
existing assets; this is probably a sensible tack since the likelihood of
privatizing the Interstate Highway System is minimal. Nevertheless, an
analysis of the efficacy of a completely privatized road system would
have been interesting.
Walters does question the authors’ argument that while privately
provided infrastructure is likely to displace other private investment,
publicly provided infrastructure, if funded by user charges or tax
revenues rather than debt, is likely to generate additional investment.
Walters believes that while the form of finance will affect the timing of
savings, total investment will remain unchanged.
Gail Fosler states that the authors provide a useful discussion of the
advantages and limitations of privatization; this effort adds an important
perspective to the work of those advocating privatization as the solution
to America’s infrastructure problem. She notes the fact, implicit in their
selection of highways and solid waste disposal facilities as examples,
that privatization of infrastructure investment and public services gen-
erally has not progressed very far.
This raises the question: If private provision of infrastructure is such
a good idea, why is it not done more frequently in the United States?14 Alicia H. Munnell
Fosler concludes that the incentives required for private participation
are extremely high. History shows that infrastructure activities are
provided privately only when they are very profitable, and that they are
often profitable when they enjoy significant noncompetitive market
advantages. As a result, the efficiency gains from private provision are
limited.
Fosler also reaffirms the authors’ point that siting is a critical issue,
and speculates that even if funding were available for all infrastructure
spending it would probably not all be spent because of the politics of
development. Fosler closes with the point that beyond providing
infrastructure, the private sector has an important role in helping to
shape the political process, so that the required levels of public spending
and taxation are forthcoming from the government with as little eco-
nomic distortion as possible.
How Efficient Is Current Infrastructure Spending and
Pricing?
Clifford Winston argues that the focus of the current policy debate
should be shifted from the question of how much to increase infrastruc-
ture spending--be it public or private--to a discussion of efficient
pricing and investment guidelines. He believes the nation does not need
to increase public capital outlays as much as it needs to price and spend
more effectively. Users of infrastructure impose costs on themselves and
others by increasing congestion and by wearing out the infrastructure.
Thus, an efficient infrastructure policy will maximize the gap between
social benefits and costs, including the costs that users impose on
others, through pricing specifications that regulate demand and invest-
ment guidelines that specify design.
Winston lays out an efficient spending policy for both highways and
airports. Current policy finances highway construction and repair
through the fuel tax; this levy does not accurately reflect the pave-
ment damage and congestion caused by different types of vehicles.
Pavement damage varies with weight per axle, and thus users should
be charged according to this measure. The current fuel tax provides the
opposite incentive, because it encourages the use of small, fuel-efficient
engines. Smaller engines, however, cannot pull as many axles as their
larger counterparts. Thus, the fuel tax indirectly encourages shippers
to use the least number of axles, and the most weight per axle, to
transport a given load, thereby creating the most pavement damage per
haul.
Pavement damage also depends on the thickness of the pavement.
Previous analysis conducted by Winston found that optimal thicknessesAN OVERVIEW 15
are significantly higher than current thicknesses. Increasing pavement
thickness would reduce annual maintenance expenditures and, by
lowering the marginal cost of a standard axle load, would soften the
impact of taxes promoting efficient pavement wear.
Winston also examines the problem of congestion and finds that
while congestion pricing has been advocated by economists for many
years, it has been ignored or dismissed by policymakers. He addresses
critics of congestion pricing by arguing that equity objections can be
overcome if revenues are used properly and by citing existing systems
that implement congestion pricing without disrupting travelers.
Winston then turns to airports and discusses the need for efficient
pricing and investment in this area. Many observers argue that airport
congestion and flight delays stem from capacity constraints. If increas-
ing capacity through construction is the only method used in addressing
the congestion problem, Winston claims that society will face a difficult
and expensive task. Building new airports involves enormous costs and
long lead times, and the predicted growth of air traffic volume is
tremendous. He argues that efficient pricing and investment can pro-
vide immediate, low-cost relief.
Currently the most common method of assessing landing fees is
by aircraft weight. This fee is inefficient, since the principal cost imposed
by an aircraft takeoff or landing is the delay it causes other aircraft.
Instead, Winston argues, congestion pricing should be implemented
and runway capacity of existing airports should be expanded to the
point where the marginal cost of an additional runway is equated with
the marginal benefit of reduced delay. While less empirical work has
been done on the effects of efficient policies on other infrastructure
areas, the available information suggests that significant benefits could
be derived.
In the final section of the paper Winston addresses common
criticisms of efficient pricing and investment--technological infeasibility
and the political difficulties of implementation. He also assesses the
alternatives to efficient infrastructure policy--traditional approaches,
privatization, and significantly increasing infrastructure spending. He
cites evidence that efficient policies can be implemented with existing,
proven technologies and believes that political hurdles could be over-
come. In comparing efficient policies with the alternatives he finds
efficient pricing and investment clearly preferable.
Alan Altshuler responds that despite the merits of the efficient
pricing and investment argument, he does question the political feasi-
bility of implementing this kind of policy. Winston’s evidence in support
of his claims is only mildly suggestive, he says. Moreover, Winston does
not carefully weigh the evidence contrary to his premise.
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political nightmare, and he will continue to view it as such until toll-road
authorities have replaced commuter discounts with peak-period sur-
charges. Business, labor, and civic groups have consistently been hostile
and quite vocal about proposed policies of this nature, and very
successful in fighting their implementation. Altshuler also disputes
Winston’s claim that user fee systems can be structured to avoid
regressivity, and to calm the ruffled feathers of vested interests.
He believes, however, that a shift in truck taxation from number of
axles to axle weight is quite plausible, since it would entail only a minor
revision of a long-standing arrangement. Airport congestion pricing
policies are increasingly being implemented, according to Altshuler, but
he doubts that they will be sufficient to alleviate airport congestion in the
face of rapid predicted traffic growth, even if used in conjunction with
runway expansion and air traffic control improvements. In sum, al-
though specific initiatives may be feasible, Altshuler sees little reason to
believe that economic efficiency will triumph in infrastructure policy; the
values on which our political system is grounded routinely conflict with
efficiency.
Michael Bell’s comments begin by highlighting what he sees as the
value in Winston’s approach. Bell believes Winston takes an important
step by considering not only the condition of the infrastructure but also
its performance, since it is the services rendered by the facility that are
important, and not the facility itself. Winston also explicitly links
spending on new construction with operation and maintenancerequire-
ments, a very important, but often neglected, approach. Finally, Bell
says that Winston raises legitimate questions about privatization, which
is often seen as a panacea.
Bell believes that Winston’s analytic approach could be extended in
the following ways: expanding the definition of the output or product of
public infrastructure spending, and including environmental costs as
part of the social costs and thus incorporating these costs into the
efficient pricing scheme.
Bell ends his discussion by raising two concerns about efficient
pricing strategy. One is the same point made by Altshuler--however
theoretically reasonable or technically feasible an idea may be, the public
may not accept it. This applies especially to congestion pricing. Second,
even if technically feasible means of pricing were accepted and im-
plemented for roads and airports, the task still remains of adapting
these types of fees to environmental projects. This could be difficult
because of distributional issues, the costs of administering such policies,
and the weakening of economic tools as they are implemented through
the political process.AN OVERVIEW 17
How Should Public Infrastructure
Be Financed?
Edward Gramlich further pursues the issue of getting the incentives
right by evaluating the various mechanisms for funding public invest-
ment. He concentrates on state and local government spending, since
the federal government undertakes little direct capital investment. The
federal role in providing grants to states and localities for capital
investment is central to the discussion, however.
Gramlich discusses three types of public capital investment and the
appropriate funding schemes for each category. He begins with public
capital investments that serve local needs with minimal spillovers to
other communities and have no distributional implications. Here he
argues that services should be financed by user fees; these fees appor-
tion payment in accordance with benefits received and ensure efficient
use. Some exceptions to this rule may arise in cases where, on equity
grounds, officials want even those unable to pay to have access to, say,
a park; the guiding principle, however, is that services that are enjoyed
locally should be paid from a local revenue source.
Gramlich then discusses the second category of government invest-
ment, the case where spillovers occur, such as in national roads,
wastewater treatment, or air pollution control. If feasible, the user fee is
again the preferred funding mechanism. If user fees are costly to assess
or inequitable, other options include the creation of a regional authority
or the introduction of matching grants from the federal government. In
the case of federal grants, the federal matching rates should correspond
to the share of benefits accruing to out-of-jurisdiction users.
While many federal grant programs were designed with this prin-
ciple in mind, their matching rates are much higher than appropriate,
with the consequence that they must be capped to limit use. Gramlich
proposes revamping the programs by reducing the matching rates
significantly, while at the same time removing the caps. Changing the
structure of these programs would go a long way to providing proper
subnational government spending incentives and reducing federal grant
spending.
The final category of investments entails both spillovers and long-
run distributional considerations; the primary examples are public
schools and higher education systems. These types of investments
require different funding mechanisms. User fees are not appropriate for
local schools, since education is a fundamental right of citizenship.
Moreover, states have frequently been instructed by the courts to offset
variations in the revenue-raising capability of communities in order to
ensure that children in low-income communities are not educationally
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program to assist poor school districts, again characterized by a cap and
a high federal matching share. Gramlich notes that the problem created
by variations in community wealth is exacerbated by the federal deduct-
ibility of local property taxes. Thus, to improve schooling for children in
underprivileged areas requires strengthening state equalization grants
for education, reforming federal grants to poor school districts by
removing existing caps and lowering the matching rate, and eliminating
the federal tax deduction for property taxes.
Higher education is another area where long-run distributional
implications come into play. In this case it is possible to impose user
fees--tuitions--to cover the full cost of the service. This happens in
some states, but typically only out-of-state students are charged the
appropriate fee. Whether or not user fees cover the full costs, higher
education has become very expensive, thus altering the issue somewhat:
if fees do not cover the full cost, how can states afford the programs, or
if fees are full cost, how can families afford it?
After examining the issue of who should pay for which facilities,
Gramlich then addresses timing questions. He emphasizes that in
financing any project the cohort that reaps the benefits should pay the
costs. Thus, capital expenditures should be financed by long-term bonds
with maturities close to the life of the asset purchased. User fees or taxes
should then pay annual depreciation plus interest and principal on the
bonds. The good news is that, for the most part, this is already
happening.
At both the federal and state levels much infrastructure investment
is financed through dedicated trust funds. Trust funds are a useful way
to link marginal benefits and costs when dedicated taxes or user fees can
be assessed and when no externalities are present. Gramlich offers some
suggestions for reform of the trust funds to best meet their intended
purposes.
Gramlich’s first discussant, Rudolph Penner, finds little with which
to disagree and expands on the problem of capped grants. Many federal
grants provide large windfalls to someone who would have engaged in
the same activity regardless of the subsidy, rather than affecting the
individual’s marginal decision. This action, while irrational by textbook
standards, is quite pervasive and thus deserves some attention. If the
design of grant systems is fundamentally flawed, it severely limits the
ability of higher-level governments to induce lower-level governments
to provide optimal levels of public capital investment.
Penner has found that many phenomena that appear perverse to
economists are often quite understandable and reasonable to legislators
and others. He offers as an explanation of the popularity of these capped
grants the fact that they convey a great deal of power to the bureaucracy
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facing politicians about the total amount required to fund a grant
program. While the current situation is far from perfect, Penner believes
it can improve. In large part improvement requires educating non-
economists to the principles of economics (such as marginal decisions
and horizontal equity). These issues are not intuitive to many people,
but they need to be understood since they form the theoretical under-
pinnings of the proposed changes.
James Poterba, while generally agreeing with Gramlich’s position,
believes that some of his recommendations are open to debate. He
begins by noting that reforms of infrastructure finance are not merely
accounting conventions; changes in financing mechanisms will also
directly affect the level of spending. For example, one study showed that
transit workers in urban mass transit systems with earmarked taxes
received higher wage increases than those in systems without ear-
marked taxes. Similarly, Poterba’s own work revealed that states with
capital budgets spent 15 percent more on capital investment than states
where capital and operating outlays were combined.
Poterba makes the same point as Penner: something must be going
on to explain the pervasiveness of capped grants in the face of all the
evidence of their inefficiency. He agrees with Penner that political
factors are at work, but believes that the most important of these is the
perceived need for equitable treatment of different jurisdictions. With
open-ended grants, rich areas may contribute several times as much as
their poorer neighbors to matching programs; the result is that absolute
transfers from the federal government to the richer areas will be larger
than those to poorer areas, thereby widening the inequities.
Poterba argues that capped grants may actually be efficient, citing
literature from regulatory economics as evidence. For example, if federal
grant-givers envision a minimum threshold of highway spending in
each jurisdiction, then high subsidy rates on expenditures up to some
level will ensure that most areas will take advantage of the program up
to that point. Even if closed-ended grants are an efficient way to achieve
an objective, Poterba emphasizes that this does not automatically imply
that existing grant programs are well designed.
Poterba also raises a point about the applicability of user fees in
certain situations. Regarding Gramlich’s recommendation of user fees
for solid waste disposal, for example, Poterba notes that user charges are
generally more successful when levied at the time a consumer purchases
a good than when charged to someone disposing of it. Finally, Poterba
believes that calls for more efficient infrastructure financing will receive
serious attention, especially given the current climate of fiscal austerity
at both the federal and state levels.20 Alicia H. Munnell
Conclusion
Infrastructure is important for the environment, the quality of life,
and economic performance. The United States has cut back sharply on
infrastructure investment in recent years. At the same time, few of the
incentives that affect the decision to invest in new public capital or to use
infrastructure services appear consistent with those advocated by econ-
omists. The question is what government officials should do now. Here
opinion is sharply divided.
Those worried about the incentives to spend, the efficiency of
design, and the appropriateness of the prices charged, want all efforts
focused on eliminating current distortions and inefficiencies. They tend
to believe that once the perversities in the existing system are removed,
the present stock of infrastructure may meet most of the nation’s needs.
Additional investment at this time will divert attention and alleviate
pressure to make the needed reforms.
While acknowledging the inadequacies in current funding, pricing,
and design, other observers still see a need for more immediate
investment. Dilapidated bridges and roads, large wastewater treatment
requirements, and other needs make additional public capital invest-
ment essential. The positive impact of infrastructure on output and
economic growth provides a further spur. Moreover, many question the
likelihood that efficient pricing mechanisms will be adopted, in the near
future.
Resolving this infrastructure debate will be essential in order to
determine the manner and appropriate level of highway and other
capital spending during the 1990s.